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INTRODUCTION
Adverse selection and moral hazard arise in markets with imperfect or
asymmetrical information, i.e., one party has more information than the other,
such as the labour market, credit market, and insurance market. Prices in
markets with imperfect information may have two effects: sorting and incentive
effects (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Interest rates sort customers into three groups,
namely, low risk, medium risk, and high risk group. With higher interest rates,
low and medium risk groups are more likely to drop out of the market.
Therefore, higher interest rates act as a screening device in rationing credit and
may adversely sort bad customers with high risk from good customers with low
risk.
Credit rationing is a situation where borrowers can not borrow even though they
are willing to pay the going interest rate. Credit rationing takes place as a result
of the perceived inability of the borrower to pay the loan (higher risk). The
adverse selection takes place when honest or conservative borrowers are deterred
from borrowing at higher interest rates. But customers who are reckless or
careless will borrow because they do not expect to pay the loan back if they go
bankrupt. As a result borrowers at higher interest rates may invest in riskier
projects to generate higher rates of return and be careless about minimisation of
risk (moral hazard).
To reduce the problem of adverse selection and moral hazards financial
institutions ration credit, i.e., extending smaller amount of loans to all customers
lower than the requirement of the customers (intensive rationing) (Jaffee and
Russell, 1976) or to ration some of the customers out of the marked (extensive
rationing) (Bester, 1985). Therefore, In the presence of adverse selection and
moral hazard, the supply of loanable funds will be backward bending or concave
over the rising portion of interest rates if credit rationing is used or increasing
function in the rate of interest if credit rationing is not used.
Theoretically, credit rationing has been studied extensively in the literature (see
for example, Jaffee and Russel 1976; Bester 1981; Stigltz and Weiss 1981 and
1987; and Riley 1987). Empirically few studies have tested the implications of
credit rationing (see for example, Nellis and Thom (1983), Stansell and Mitchell
(1985), Goodwin (1986), Martin and Smyth (1991), and Marashdeh (1994)).
Marashdeh (1994) studies the impact of adverse selection and moral hazard on
the Malaysian credit market over the 1983:1-1993:11 and finds that credit
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rationing is not practised in the Malaysian credit market, i.e., the presence of
adverse selection. However, commercial banks were willing to give more loans
at higher interest rates which contribute to the problem of moral hazard. He
attributed the absence of credit rationing to the enforcement of lending
guidelines to the priority sectors during the period of the study and the concern
of banks about their profitability as well as the absence of a Deposit Insurance
Agency.
Martin and Smyth (1991) tested empirically the implications of adverse selection
and moral hazard on the US home mortgage market over 1968:6-1989:3. By
using three stage least squares, they estimated two market models (representative
loan model and aggregate loan model). They find that the mortgage supply
under both models is concave function in the rate of interest, i.e., the presence of
adverse selection and moral hazard. Moreover, they find that the optimal interest
rate at which the supply function bends backward is equal to 11 percent.
Goodwin (1986) studies the impact of credit rationing on the mortgage market
and how it spills over into the housing market. He finds that "a one standard
deviation increase in excess mortgage demand (credit rationing) results in a 0.29
standard deviation decrease in houses sold" (p.459). Marashdeh (1993) studies
the sectoral demand for credit in Malaysia over the 1972:2-1991:4. He finds that
the demands for commercial banks' and finance companies' credit are positively
related to real income and real lagged credit demand and negatively related to
real interest rates on loans.
The impact of credit rationing on other mortgage markets has not been studied
empirically so far, and especially in Malaysia. Moreover, the impact of credit
rationing on the Malaysian mortgage market has not been studied yet. Indeed,
most of the empirical studies have confined themselves either to the US or U.K
mortgage markets. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to test empirically the
impact of adverse selection and moral hazard on the Malaysian mortgage
market. The paper modifies the model used by Martin and Smyth (1991) to the
Malaysian mortgage credit by using quarterly data over the 1980:1-1993:2
period which has seen two recessions and several years of sustained economic
growth. Unconstrained 3SLS is used to estimate the model. The paper, also,
highlights the regulatory structure of the mortgage market.
REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The central bank intervened in the housing credit market by adopting two
policies to help the low and medium income families to own a house. First, the
bank issued lending guidelines to commercial banks and finance companies to
extend a certain amount of their credit to finance a minimum number of housing
units for the low and medium income families; second, the bank sat a ceiling on
the interest rate on housing loans to the low and medium income families. Prior
to 1976, commercial banks and finance companies were required to extend at
least 50 percent of their total savings to housing loans and long-term
government securities. However, in 1976, they were required to extend at least
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10 percent of loans outstanding at the end of the previous year to new housing
loans. In 1979, new lending guidelines were imposed whereby commercial banks
and finance companies were asked to allocate a percentage of their outstanding
loans to individual housing. In the case of commercial banks this was 10 percent
of their outstanding loans at the end of the previous year and 20 percent in the
case of finance companies' outstanding loans at the end of the previous year.
Table 1: Housing Loan Commitments of Commercial Banks and Finance
Companies (in thousands of units)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986-87 1988-89 April,92 -March,94
A. Commercial Banks
Total 20 20 20 25 80 75 75
Low-cost houses na na na na 48 45 na
Bumiputera Community 6 6 6 6 24 22.5 na
Actually financed 19.503 21.708 25.738 26.334 61.529 66.956 54.92*
B. Finance Companies
Total 5 5 5 7.5 20 25 25
Low-cost houses na na na na 12 15 na
Bumiputera Community 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 6 7.5 na
Actually financed 6.921 6.082 7.651 8.329 19.049 22.318 24.339*
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Reports, 1982-1992. * As at the end of 1993.
Table l(Continued): Amount of Shortfall or Surplus and ( number of
non-complying institutions)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986-87 1988-89 April,92 -March,94
A. Commercial Banks
Total 497 +1706 +5738(21) +6334(11) 18471(26) 8044(16) 20080(21)
Low-cost houses na na na na 19851(30) 12197(25) na
Bumiputera Community 1425 308 +1735(27) +2108(16) 8087(31) 6694(27) na
B. Finance Companies
Total +1921 +1082 +2651(5) +3329(4) 951(14) 2682(16) 661(9)
Low-cost houses na na na na 1219(21) 2519(19) na
Bumiputera Community 16 +373 +705(10) +606(8) 866(19) 1171(21) na
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Reports, 1982-1992.
* As at the end of 1993, + represents a surplus, na is not available.
However, by 1982, commercial banks and finance companies were asked to
make firm commitments to finance certain number of new units of houses for
low income individuals (see Table 1). In 1985, for example, commercial banks
were required to finance at least 25000 units of newly constructed houses costing
RM 100,000 or less (7500 units in the case of finance companies), of which 6000
units should be for Bumiputera individuals (1500 units in the case of finance
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companies). For the period April 1988- December 1989, commercial banks were
required to make firm commitments to finance the purchase of at least 75000
units of houses costing RM 100,000 or less each of which 45,000 units should be
for low cost houses costing RM 25,000 or less. Of the total, 25,000 units were for
Bumiputera individuals purchase of houses (BNM, 1994, p.167). In March
1990, lending guidelines on housing loans were abandoned as a result of the
strong growth of the economy. However, in April 1992, lending guidelines were
reinstated because of the difficulty which lower income group found in financing
housing costing RM 100,000 or less. As a result, commercial banks and finance
companies were asked to finance at least 100,000 units (of which 25000 units by
finance companies) costing RM 100,000 or less each, with a commitment value
of RM 6 billion. The deadline for the compliance was set at mid March, 1994.
In addition to lending guidelines on housing loans, the central bank fixed the
interest rate on housing loans. Effective April 1981, ceiling interest rate on
housing loans was raised to 10 percent p.a. from 9 percent p.a. for loans
exceeding RM 100,000. However, for loans less than RM 100,000 the ceiling
remained at 9 percent p.a. The ceiling was further raised in March 30, 1985 to
11 percent p.a. for housing loans were the cost of land and the house on it is
between RM 60,000 and RM 100,000, and to 10 percent p.a. on housing loans
costing less than RM 60,000 (BNM, 1985). Interest rate on housing loans for
owner-occupied houses costing RM 100,000 or less was set at 1.75 points above
the base lending rate (BLR) of each banking institution or 9 percent p.a.,
/whichever is lower (BNM, 1994, p. 167). Effective November 2, 1992, the
government provided an interest subsidy of 1 percent p.a. to commercial banks
and finance companies for approved and firmly committed housing loans costing
RM 100,000 or less, that is, the customer pays 9 percent p.a. interest. This
subsidy was meant for first time buyer owner-occupied house with monthly
income of not more than RM 1500 (combined income for married buyers) for
purchase or construction of a house costing RM 50,000 or less; and not more
than RM 2800 (combined income for married buyers) for houses costing between
RM 50,001 and RM 100,000 each.
A question arises here is whether the policy of directing credit to the low and
medium income families achieved its goal in giving these families access to
house ownership. The answer to this question falls outside the scope of this
paper but intuitively one can say to a certain degree it was partially successful
with many problems such as the resale of low and medium cost houses by their
owners, abandoned or uncompleted projects (around 300 projects), developers'
reluctance to build low and medium cost housing. However, one could say that
over the period of the study, commercial banks and finance companies were
required to finance 407,500 units of low and medium cost housing compared to
actual financing of 345,043 units, i.e., a shortfall of 62,457 units. Financial
institutions were willing to pay penalty for the shortfall instead of extending
credit to low and medium cost housing. Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness
of the policy, one would compare the number of eligible households to the
number of units built thus far. However, this is not feasible as data on the
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number of eligible household and a breakdown of the number of units built for
low and medium cost housing are unavailable.
There are eight different financial institutions that finance housing in Malaysia.
They are commercial banks, finance companies, Malaysia Mortgage Finance
Bhd, Borneo Housing Mortgage Finance Bhd, Sabah Credit Corporation, Bank
Rakyat, National Savings Bank, and Treasury Housing Loans Division.
However, this study examines commercial banks' and finance companies'
mortgage markets because bf lack of quarterly data on other markets. Indeed for
the period of study commercial banks and finance companies provided on
average more than 50 percent of housing loans (see Table 2 for more details).
Table 2: Housing Loans Outstanding
1 2 3
ALL* FINANCE COMPANIES COMMERCIAL BANKS 2+3
Year Institutions Total % Total % As of 1
1980 4986.0 619.8 12.43 2232.1 44.76 57.19
1981 7001.0 833.4 11.90 2811.4 40.15 52.06
1982 9468.3 1072.1 11.32 3197.3 33.76 45.09
1983 11406.9 1282.6 11.24 4157.7 36.44 47.69
1984 13635.3 1542.9 11.31 5129.5 37.61 48.93
1985 16373.0 1828.8 11.16 6306.3 38.51 49.68
1986 18085.0 2075.4 11.47 7038.7 38.92 50.39
1987 20362.0 2162.5 10.62 7259.3 35.65 46.27
1988 21055.0 2333.2 11.08 7713.3 36.63 47.71
1989 22436.0 2671.0 11.90 8142.6 36.29 48.19
1990 25581.0 3365.4 13.15 9588.6 37.48 50.63
1991 29911.0 4288.9 14.33 11587.9 38.74 53.08
1992 32321.0 5077.4 15.70 12702.6 39.30 55.01
1993 36714.0 6039.8 16.45 14508.3 39.51 55.96
Average 19238.2 2513.8 12.43 7312.5 38.12 50.56
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Reports and Quarterly Bulletins and the Author's calculations.
* All Financial Institutions include commercial banks, finance companies, Malaysia Mortgage Finance
Bhd, Borneo Housing Mortgage Finance Bhd, Sabah Credit Corporation, Bank Rakyat, National
Savings Bank, and Treasury Housing Loans Division.
THE MODEL
The mortgage loan supply is assumed to depend on interest rate (lending rate).
However, in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, interest rate on
loans is entered as a second degree polynomial which is negatively expected to
influence mortgage loan supply if credit rationing is practised. However, if credit
rationing is not practised, then interest rate squared is expected to influence
mortgage supply positively. In addition, it is expected that the cost of funds will
influence the availability of loans. The interest rate on deposits is used to capture
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the costs of funds which is negatively expected to influence mortgage loan
supply. Competing short and long-term interest rates are expected to influence
the mortgage loan supply negatively. With higher interest rates banks and
finance companies may divert their funds away from mortgage loans into
investment in securities, thus negatively influencing mortgage loan supply.
Default rate on loans is expected to influence mortgage loan supply negatively,
that is, the higher the default rate is the lower the supply of mortgage loans will
be. Profit is adversely affected by the inflation risk. The inflation rate is used to
capture the inflation risk.
The mortgage loan demand is basically a derived demand, that is, it arises as a
result of activities in the housing market. Therefore, factors affecting the housing
market are expected to influence the mortgage loan demand concurrently.
Therefore, the mortgage loan demand is assumed to depend on interest rate on
loans, current income, rate of inflation in renter's cost, rate of inflation in
homeowner's cost, real purchase price of the house, and down payment. Interest
rate on loans is negatively influencing the mortgage loan demand. Current
income is used rather than permanent income as it is the variable used by banks
and finance companies to qualify customers for loans which is positively
expected to influence mortgage loan demand (Goodwin, 1986). Down payment
is expected to influence mortgage loan demand negatively. The rate of inflation
in renter's cost is expected to influence mortgage loan demand positively (Martin
and Smyth, 1991). The rate of inflation in homeowner's cost is expected to
influence mortgage loan demand negatively (Martin and Smyth, 1991). The real
purchase price of the house is expected to influence mortgage loan demand
positively (Martin and Smyth, 1991). A dummy variable is added to the loan
supply to capture the impact of the removal of lending guidelines on commercial
banks and financed companies on the first quarter of 1990. The dummy variable
for commercial banks and finance companies takes a value of 1 for
1990:1-1992:1 and a value of zero otherwise.
Therefore, the model could be written as follows for commercial banks and
finance companies:
Lsj t = F(RLj t, RL SQUAREDj t, RDt, RBILLt, RGSt,
DEREGULATION^ t, DEFAULT RATEt t, INFLATION^Ldj t = G (RLj t, INCOMEt, INFRENTt, INFCOST^, PRICEt,DOWNPAYMENTt)
where,
Ls is mortgage loan supply deflated by the consumer price index (CPI).
Ld is mortgage loan demand deflated by the CPI.
RL is average lending rate for commercial banks/ finance companies.
RD is the weighted mode deposit rate (rd) of savings and fixed deposits and is
calculated as follows: RD= rs(savings deposits/ total deposits) +rf (fixed
deposits/total deposits), where rs is the mode savings deposit rate, rf is the
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mode 6-months fixed deposit rates, total deposits is the sum of fixed,
current, and savings deposit.
DOWNPAYMENT is the down payment on mortgage loans.
RBILL is the rate of interest on 3 months treasury bills.
RGS is rate of interest on 10 years government securities.
INCOME is current income represented by the industrial production index (IPI)
deflated by CPI.
DEFAULT RATE is the rate of default on loans.
INFRENT is the annualized rate of inflation in renter's cost.
INFCOST is the annualized rate of inflation in home owner's cost.
PRICE is the real purchase price of the house.
INFLATION is the annualized rate of inflation.
DEREGULATION is a dummy for deregulation of credit guidelines,
t is time index.
i is industry index for commercial banks or finance companies or both.
For estimation purposes the model could be written in semi-log form as:
logLs i,t = aj + a2iogRLj t
- a3logRL SQUAREDj t
- a4logRDt
- a5logRBILLt
± a6DEREGULATION(
- a?INFLATIONt
+ e u
logLdj t = bj - b2logRLi t
+ b3logINCOMEt
+ B4INFRENTt
- B5INFCOSTt
+ e2t
where e ^ t and e7t are error terms. Moreover, seasonal dummies for the second tothe fourth quarter are added to the demand equation. Lack of data on RGS,
PRICE, DOWNPAYMENT and DEFAULT RATE led to the exclusion of these
variables from the model .
DATA ESTIMATION AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
All data for the variables are collected from the Quarterly Bulletin of Bank
Negara Malaysia. The rate of inflation in renter's cost is proxied by the rate of
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inflation in rent, fuel, and transportation which is calculated as 400*(the change
in log(CPI for rent, fuel, and transportation)). The rate of inflation in home
owner’s cost is proxied by the rate of inflation in furniture, furnishings and house
hold equipment which is calculated as 400*(the change in log(CPI for furniture,
furnishings and house hold equipment)). The inflation rate is measured as
400*(the change in Log(CPI)).
Three stage least squares is used to estimate the model with partial and without
partial adjustment. All exogenous variables in the model are used as instruments
in the first stage to estimate the endogenous variables, i .e. , average lending rate
and loan quantity. Lagged average lending rate was used as an additional
instrument for finance companies' average lending rate. The sample period is
1980:1-1993:2. The summary statistics of all variables is reported in Appendix I.
The model was estimated in level form as well. The results remained the same as
of those of the semi-log, i.e., the model is robust to functional specifications.
The model was re-estimated by using partial adjustment in both demand and
supply equations. Partial adjustment in the demand equation enters as those who
are denied credit by one institution may search for another (Martin and Smyth,
1991) and through the habit persistence hypothesis (Marashdeh, 1993). Partial
adjustment enters the supply equation as lenders might be unable to adjust
administratively due to rise in loan applications (Martin and Smyth, 1991).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The model was estimated separately for commercial banks, finance companies,
and the aggregate of commercial banks and finance companies.
RESULTS FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS’ MORTGAGE MARKET
Table 3 reports the three stage least squares estimate of commercial banks
mortgage supply and demand over the 1980:3-1993:2 period. The overall fit of
the model is good as indicated by the R-bar squared and SEE. For the supply
equation, most variables are having the anticipated sign except for t-bill rate.
However, the mortgage supply is insensitive to the average lending rate and
average lending rate squared. This might be explained by the fact that banks
tried to comply with lending guidelines to the housing sector. This, also, could
be seen clearly from the sign and significance of the dummy variable for
deregulation which measures relaxing of the lending guidelines. The highly
significant positive sign for deregulation indicates that banks were willing to
offer more mortgage loans when lending guidelines were lifted in 1990:1-1992: 1
period. Indeed, lifting lending guidelines increased mortgage supply by 3.04
percent.
The cost of deposits is significantly negatively related to mortgage supply
indicating that the higher the cost of deposits the lower the mortgage supply. A 1
percent rise in interest rate on deposits lowers the mortgage supply by 1.35
percent. Interest rate on three months treasury bills is highly significant but
62 ASIAN ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
having the wrong sign. This might be due to the fact that commercial banks are
required to hold certain percentage of their assets in terms of t-bills. Inflation
risk is having the anticipated sign but insignificant.
The demand for mortgage is negatively related to the rate of average lending rate
and home owner's cost. A 1 percent rise in average lending rates reduces
mortgage demand by 0.51 percent and a 1 percent rise in home owner's cost
reduces mortgage demand by 0.3 percent. The demand for mortgage is positively
related to income, and renters cost. A 1 percent rise in income increases
mortgage demand by 1.18 percent and a 1 percent rise in renter's cost increases
mortgage demand by 0.03 percent. The seasonal dummies are statistically
insignificant except for the fourth quarter which is negatively influencing
mortgage demand.
Table 3: Three Stage Estimate of Commercial Banks' Mortgage Supply
And Mortgage Demand Without Partial Adjustment 1980:3-1993:2
Supply Demand
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STAT COEFFICIENT T-STAT
CONSTANT -0.446932 -0.03 10.38976 40.62*
LENDING RATE 6.192815 0.60 -0.51051 -4.65*
LENDING RATE
SQUARED 0.837554 -0.38
T-BILL RATE 0.965624 9.35*
DEPOSIT RATE -1.348670 -9.39*
DEREGULATION 0.304201 3.49*
INFLATION RISK 0.002402 0.33
RENT INFLATION 0.003687 3.95*
INCOME 1.194040 32.81*
COST INFLATION -0.031469 -10.11*
SECOND QUARTER -0.023164 -1.39
THIRD QUARTER -0.007913 -0.47
FOURTH QUARTER -0.003177 -1.75*
SUMMARY STATISTICS
RBAR-SQUARED 0.824 0.987
N 53 53
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 46 45
SEE 0.1698 0.0458
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
The results from the estimation of the model with partial adjustment in both
demand and supply are reported in Table 4. The results are similar to those
without the partial adjustment mechanism. The mortgage supply is insensitive to
average lending rate. The mortgage supply is increasing function of t-bill rate
and lagged mortgage credit supply and a decreasing function of deposit rate. The
demand for mortgage is a decreasing function of average lending rate and home
owner's cost and increasing function of income, renter's cost and lagged
mortgage credit. The data do not support the adverse selection-moral hazard
hypothesis in commercial banks' mortgage market.
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Table 4: Three Stage Estimate of Commercial Banks* Mortgage Supply
And Mortgage Demand With Partial Adjustment 1980:3-1993:2
Supply Demand
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STAT COEFFICIENT T-STAT
CONSTANT -4.065271 -0.59 9.088143 15.65*
LENDING RATE 4.872619 0.83 -0.4172972 -3.69*
LENDING RATE
SQUARED -0.719339 -0.58
T-BILL RATE 0.414883 5.39*
DEPOSIT RATE -0.627545 -5.83*
LAGGED CREDIT 0.656522 10.44* 0.1190972 2.38*
DEREGULATION 0.168464 3.30*
INFLATION RISK -0.000339 -0.10
RENT INFLATION 0.0033943 3.66*
INCOME 1.0673680 15.65*
COST INFLATION -0.0292656 -9.12*
SECOND QUARTER -0.0255814 -1.52
THIRD QUARTER -0.0064608 -0.39
FOURTH QUARTER -0.0330394 -1.85*
SUMMARY STATISTICS
RBAR-SQUARED 0.9389 0.987
N 52 52
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 44 43
SEE 0.09§7 0.0461
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 5: Three Stage Estimate of Finance Companies* Mortgage Supply
And Mortgage Demand Without Partial Adjustment 1980:3-1993:2
Supply Demand
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STAT COEFFICIENT T-STAT
CONSTANT -53.93113 -3.32* 8.251136 103.55*
LENDING RATE 47.53003 3.75* -0.046438 -1.49
LENDING RATE
SQUARED -9.139160 -3.69*
T-BILL RATE 0.987186 10.57*
DEPOSIT RATE -1.017071 -13.86*
DEREGULATION 0.146179 2.16*
INFLATION RISK -0.001817 -0.30
RENT INFLATION 0.004168 13.15*
INCOME 1.680626 210.71*
COST INFLATION -0.024430 -29.37*
SECOND QUARTER 0.003239 0.57
THIRD QUARTER 0.000213 0.04
FOURTH QUARTER 0.005792 0.94
SUMMARY STATISTICS
RBAR-SQUARED 0.83 0.9986
N53 53
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 46 45
SEE 0.2044 0.01878
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
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THE RESULTS FOR FINANCE COMPANIES’ MORTGAGE MARKET
The three stage estimation of the model for finance companies' mortgage market
is reported in Table 5. The overall fit of the model is good as indicated by the
R-bar squared and SEE. The mortgage supply is a concave function of the
average lending rate. The coefficient for RL is positive and highly significant. A
1 percent rise in RL increases mortgage supply by 47.3 percent . While the
coefficient for RL squared is negative and highly significant. A 1 percent rise in
RL squared reduces mortgage supply by 9.12 percent.
A point estimate of the finance companies' optimal interest rate at which the
loan supply bends backward is obtained by differentiating the loan supply
equation with respect to the average lending rate (RL), that is,
dLs/dRL= (a 2 -a ‘3 logRL)Ls/RL
The optimal interest rate, RL*, is the implicit solution of dLs/dr=0, that is, the
point solution is
Log RL= -a2/2a3 (1)
substitution of a 2 and a 3 in the above yields the point estimate of RL*= 13.41
for the equation without the partial adjustment. Using the gradient vector from
equation 1 and the covariance matrix from the third stage estimates, the
ninety-five percent confidence interval for the point estimate, RL*=13.47 percent
lies between 11.45 percent and 15.37 percent. The upper bound of this
confidence interval is well within the interest rate in the sample. The highest
interest rate observed was 15.88 percent in the fourth quarter of 1983. That is, at
RL*=13.47 finance companies start to ration credit to reduce the problems of
adverse selection and moral hazards.
The coefficient for other variables are as expected except for t-bill rate. Inflation
risk and deregulation are having the expected sign but statistically insignificant.
Deposit rate is negatively influencing the mortgage supply. A 1 percent rise in
deposit rate reduces mortgage supply by 0.95 percent.
All the variables in the mortgage demand are having the anticipated signs. The
RL is having the anticipated sign but statistically insignificant. This might be
due to the fact that borrowers from finance companies might not be able to
borrow from commercial banks or other financial institutions with a lower
interest rate. Thus accepting the high interest rates imposed by finance
companies. As expected income is positively influencing mortgage demand. A 1
percent rise in income increases mortgage demand by 1.68 percent. Renter's cost
is positively influencing mortgage demand. Home owner's cost is negatively
influencing mortgage demand. The seasonal dummies are statistically
insignificant.
The estimation of the model with the partial adjustment is reported in Table 6.
The results of this estimation are similar to those without the partial adjustment
model except for the inflation risk which becomes statistically significant at
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better than 5 percent level . The mortgage supply is a concave function of RL.
The mortgage supply is an increasing function of RL, t-bill rate, and lagged
mortgage credit. The mortgage supply is a decreasing function of RL
SQUARED, deposit rate, and inflation risk. The point estimate of the finance
companies' optimal interest rate for the partial adjustment equation is
RL*=13.66 percent. The ninety-five percent confidence interval for the point
estimate, RL*=13.66 percent lies between 11.7 percent and 15.53 percent. The
mortgage demand is an increasing function of income and renter's cost and a
decreasing function of RL and home owner's cost.
Table 6: Three Stage Estimate of Finance Companies’ Mortgage Supply
And Mortgage Demand With Partial Adjustment 1980:3-1993:2
Supply Demand
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STAT COEFFICIENT T-STAT
CONSTANT -26.05023 -1.98* 8.242802 48.19*
LENDING RATE 22.34651 2.13* -0.050960 -1.55
LENDING RATE
SQUARED -4.27397 -2.09*
T-BILL RATE 0.39969 4.12*
DEPOSIT RATE -0.39546 -4.92*
LAGGED CREDIT 0.60294 8.11* 0.001800 0.10
DEREGULATION 0.06382 1.21
INFLATION RISK -0.01059 -2.34*
RENT INFLATION 0.004450 12.69*
INCOME 1.671604 56.12*
COST INFLATION -0.023638 -25.06*
SECOND QUARTER 0.005898 0.85
THIRD QUARTER 0.000907 0.13
FOURTH QUARTER 0.006801 0.92
SUMMARY STATISTICS
RBAR-SQUARED 0.935 0.9986
N 52 52
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 44 43
SEE 0.1251 0.0184
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
THE RESULTS FOR AGGREGATE MORTGAGE MARKET
The three stage estimation of the aggregate mortgage supply and demand is
reported in Table 7. The mortgage supply is insensitive to the average lending
rate and average lending rate squared as in the commercial banks' mortgage
supply. The mortgage supply is significantly negatively related to deposit rates
and positively related to t-bill rate, and deregulation. All variables in the
mortgage demand are having the expected signs. The mortgage demand is a
decreasing function of average lending rate, home owner's cost and the fourth
quarter dummy.
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Table 7: Three Stage Estimate of Aggregate Mortgage Supply
And Mortgage Demand Without Partial Adjustment 1980:3-1993:2
Supply Demand
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STAT COEFFICIENT T-STAT
CONSTANT 1.865302 0.09 10.86780 45.31*
LENDING RATE 3.784924 0.22 -0.5720901 -5.71*
LENDING RATE
SQUARED -0:2179748 -0.06
T-BILL RATE 0.9665203 10.08*
DEPOSIT RATE -1.318241 11.31*
DEREGULATION 0.2754461 3.44*
INFLATION RISK 0.0022197 0.32
RENT INFLATION 0.0045036 6.42*
INCOME 1.317423 57.14*
COST INFLATION -0.0314611 -13.52*
SECOND QUARTER -0.0166940 -1.40
THIRD QUARTER -0.0056387 -0.47
FOURTH QUARTER -0.0229540 -1.78*
SUMMARY STATISTICS
RBAR-SQUARED 0.842 0.994
N 53 53
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 46 45
SEE 0.16955 0.03228
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 8: Three Stage Estimate of Aggregate Mortgage Supply And
Mortgage Demand With Partial Adjustment 1980:3-1993:2
Supply Demand
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STAT COEFFICIENT T-STAT
CONSTANT -4.700588 -0.39 10.28238 22.46*
LENDING RATE 5.248881 0.53 -0.505579 -4.88*
LENDING RATE
SQUARED -0.726236 -0.35
T-BILL RATE 0.395207 5.27*
DEPOSIT RATE -0.611285 -6.39*
LAGGED CREDIT 0.634022 10.42* 0.045487 1.27
DEREGULATION 0.150968 3.19*
INFLATION RISK -0.001278 -0.32
RENT INFLATION 0.004175 5.88*
INCOME 1.269931 24.81*
COST INFLATION -0.030253 -12.47*SECOND QUARTER -0.018726 -1.52THIRD QUARTER -0.005938 -0.49FOURTH QUARTER -0.024129 -1.83*
SUMMARY STATISTICS
RBAR-SQUARED 0.947 0.994
N 52 52
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 44 43
SEE 0.09735 0.03284
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
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The mortgage demand is increasing function of income and renter's cost. The
three stage estimation of the model with partial adjustment is reported in Table
8. The results are the same as those for the model without the partial adjustment.
The partial adjustment in the demand function is insignificant, however.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to test empirically the impact of adverse selection
and moral hazards on the commercial banks' mortgage market, finance
companies' mortgage market and the aggregate mortgage market over the
1980:1-1993:2 period. A mortgage supply and demand were specified in
semi=log form and estimated by using unconstrained 3SLS. The model was
estimated with partial adjustment and without partial adjustment for the three
mortgage markets with a total of six models. The model is robust to functional
specifications as the model was estimated in level form and the results remained
the similar to those of the semi-log form.
Controlling for average lending rate and average lending rate squared, all the
coefficients of the estimated supply and demand functions were significant at the
5 percent level except for inflation risk. The study shows that the commercial
banks mortgage supply is insensitive to the average lending rate and average
lending rate squared, that is, credit rationing is not practised by commercial
banks. Thus the data do not support the adverse selection-moral hazard problem
in the case of commercial banks. The results are the same for the aggregate
mortgage supply as commercial banks account for the bulk of mortgage credit
outstanding. This might be explained by the enforcement of lending guidelines
and the imposition of a maximum interest chargeable on low and medium cost
housing. Indeed, for the 1990:1-1992:2 period when credit guidelines were
removed, mortgage supply increased but lending to the low and medium cost
housing declined. This decline led the central bank to reimpose the lending
guidelines in April 1992.
However, for finance companies' mortgage supply, the findings support the
adverse selection-moral hazard problem, That is, finance companies used credit
rationing to reduce the adverse selection moral hazard problem. The optimal
average lending rate at which finance companies started to ration credit is
around 13.5 percent. The ninety-five percent confidence interval for the point
estimate falls between 11.45 percent and 15.55 percent.
The study recommends that the central bank should abandon the policy of fixing
the rate of interest on housing loans for the low and medium cost housing in
favour of quantitative lending guidelines. The policy of subsidising the interest
rate for low and medium cost housing is a step in the right direction. The
amount of the subsidy, however, should be determined based on the market
forces to compensate financial institutions for the risk undertaken by financing
such a group. In addition, to encourage lending to this group, the central bank or
an insurance company should act as a guarantor of the housing loans to low and
medium cost housing. This type of insurance will reduce the exposure of
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financial institutions to the risk associated with lending to low and medium cost
housing and thus motivate financial institutions to lend more to low and medium
cost housing.
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APPENDIX Is SAMPLE STATISTICS ON DATA
Variable N Mean STD Error Minimum Maximum
Endogenous Variables
Aggregate
Average lending rate (%)1 54 11.130 1.1717 9.4625 12.968
Mortgage credit (million)* 54 9187.2 3800.8 3219.8 16570.
Commercial Banks
Average lending rate (%) 54 10.607 1.3496 8.4200 12.810
Mortgage credit (million)* 54 6912.2 2686.7 2540.1 11736.
Finance Companies
Average lending rate (%) 54 12.664 1.3351 10.390 15.880
Mortgage credit (million)* 54 2275.0 1131.7 679.73 4833.5
Exogenous Variables
a. Instruments
Deposit rate (%) 54 5.9300 2.1192 2.7576 10.500
T-bill rate (%) 54 5.0954 1.4420 2.1670 7.9770
Inflation rate (%) 53 3.4334 3.8090 -4.2126 16.431
Rent inflation (%) 53 2.3748 7.7622 -31.894 28.183
Cost inflation (%) 53 2.4223 2.8292 -1.3817 13.418
Income (%)* 54 78.406 22.431 44.561 117.83
Deregulation (banks) 54 0.1666 0.37618 0.0000 1.0000
Deregulation (finance) 54 0.4074 0.49597 0.0000 1.0000
b. Others
CPI(1990=1) 54 0.9249 0.1057 0.7119 1.1220
IPI(1990=1) 54 0.7464 0.2907 0.3696 1.3138
CPI rent(1990=1) 54 0.9724 0.09298 0.7402 1.0930
CPI cost(1990=1) 54 0.9423 0.07580 0.7842 1.0810
* Variables are measured in real terms.
* Is a weighted average of commercial banks' average lending rate and finance
companies' average lending rate. The weight is their share of the mortgage market.
The total of finance companies' and commercial banks' mortgage credit.
